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Abstract 
As of 1 January 2000 the government of the north-eastern Italian region of Friuli-
Venezia Giulia (FVG) introduced a substantial bonus at birth. The birth bonus 
was differentiated by marital status (only married women were eligible), 
citizenship (only Italians were eligible), and birth order (the bonus grew for the 
second and especially the third birth). Moreover, the income threshold below 
which one got the bonus was fairly high. As of 1 January 2004 a new government 
substantially reduced the bonus amount as well as the upper income limit. We 
evaluate if the bonuses handed out in FVG during those four years (2000-03) had 
a significant impact on fertility and abortion choices, verifying whether fertility 
changed in a different way for women more affected by the new legislation. We 
also test if the impact of monetary measures was higher for less educated women, 
because in Italy the relationship between income and education is very strong, and 
the bonus was practically the same irrespective of income level, hence its relative 
impact should be stronger in a poorer family. We use two different methods: First, 
we compare the trends of births and abortion ratios, separately for women 
affected and not affected by the monetary measures, looking at the differential 
changes. Second, using log-linear models, we measure if the interactions among 
time, parity, marital status, citizenship and education are statistically significant in 
the direction that follows our expectations. Our results show that for low educated 
(and hence also less rich) women with one or (especially) two and more children, 
birth trends did change after 1999, whereas the trends for childless women living 
in FVG and for low-educated women living in other Italian regions did not 
change. 
                                                 
∗ Giovanna Boccuzzo (author of correspondence), Department of Statistical Sciences, University of 
Padua, via C.Battisti 241, 35121 Padua, Italy. Email: boccuzzo@stat.unipd.it 
Marcantonio Caltabiano, Department of Economics, Statistics, Mathematics and Sociology, 
University of Messina, Messina, Italy. 
Gianpiero Dalla Zuanna, Department of Statistical Sciences, University of Padua, Padua, Italy. 
Marzia Loghi, Istat – Italian National Statistical Institute, Rome, Italy. 
DOI: 10.1553/populationyearbook2008s125 The impact of the bonus at birth on reproductive behaviour  126 
1  Introduction 
There appears to be general scepticism in the literature over whether public 
policies have an impact on choices concerning fertility. For instance, in a detailed 
overview of the influence policies have on birth rates, Gauthier (2007) stated that  
“[o]verall, thus, the multivariate studies provide mixed conclusions as to the 
effect of policies on demographic and economic behaviour, once other factors 
such as education, income, etc. are ‘controlled’ for. The effect—if any—tends 
moreover to be small. Methodological issues may be at the basis of these 
inconclusive findings …” (see also Gauthier 2004).  
These results are substantially confirmed by a recent econometric analysis 
(Kalwij 2008). 
On the other hand, scholars have shown that in Italy—from 1999 on—some 
monetary allowances aimed at poor couples with three or more children below 
age 18 have significantly increased the parity progression ratio from second to 
third birth for poor women, and have decreased the abortion ratio for women with 
two children in the same group (Billari et  al. 2005). In the present paper we 
further investigate this issue, employing a similar methodological and substantive 
approach. More specifically, we consider the north-eastern Italian region of 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia (FVG, population of 1.2 million at the beginning of 2008), 
where despite extremely low fertility rates over the last 30 years (the period total 
fertility rate, TFR, was below 1.5 from 1978 onward and fell below 1.2 in 1992-
2003) there are now some signs of recovery (the TFR reached 1.3 in 2007). Since 
FVG is one of the six autonomous Italian regions—and as such has greater 
political and fiscal autonomy—the region has been able to develop strong family 
policies, reinforcing national legislation. From 2000-03 FVG implemented a 
particularly generous bonus at birth for women with one or more children. 
The statistical techniques employed aim at isolating the effect of the bonus on 
reproductive and abortive behaviour, and not at explaining the causes of lowest-
low fertility in Italy in general or in FVG alone. Research conducted on the latter 
issue has suggested a number of causes for the very low birth rates. These include 
insufficient compatibility between female participation in the labour force and 
fertility, in part a consequence of an ungenerous welfare system towards families 
with children (Bettio and Villa 1998; Salvini 2004). Scholars have also pointed 
out the high degree of gender inequality within the family, which often sees the 
woman take on a heavy workload, especially if she is not a housewife but has a 
job as well (McDonald 2000; Mills et al. 2008). Yet others have underlined the 
excessive amount of responsibility parents feel for the social status of their 
children (Livi Bacci 2001; Dalla Zuanna 2001). Finally, over the course of the 
1980s and 1990s, increasing secularism (implying a diminishing influence of the 
Catholic church on Italians’ personal choices) may have played a role in the 
particularly dramatic decline of fertility in FVG and in Italy more generally (Dalla 
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Over the last twenty years, the economy of FVG has thrived and 
unemployment has been practically inexistent. This has been accompanied by 
high levels of foreign immigration into the region and an income growth rate on 
average higher than that of the nation, and in line with the richer and more 
dynamic regions of Europe. Widespread wealth and continuous growth, however, 
have not prevented certain groups of people from limiting their fertility for 
economic reasons. For example, at the end of 2001, representative samples of 
mothers aged about 42, living in five Italian cities (including Udine, the second 
largest city in FVG, population of 100,000 in 2007) were asked about their 
motivations for not having another child (De Santis and Breschi 2003). Two of 
these motivations were directly linked to economic matters (“It was too expensive 
to have another child” and “Another child would have damaged the economic 
well-being of the children I already have”). Both reasons saw a gradient by 
education. In particular, 63% and 44% of low educated women with two or more 
children agreed to the two statements, respectively, compared to 23% and 16% 
among high educated women with two or more children. This is most likely not a 
problem of education, but the results rather mirror the ‘income effect’: in Italy 
education and income are strongly related. In 2000, the mean income of a man 
aged 30-44 with less than an upper secondary education was 72% of that of his 
age-mates with an upper secondary education (the same proportion was 86-87% 
in France, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Germany, OECD 2004, Table A11.1a). 
Consequently, the bonus  at birth may have pushed the less rich and/or less 
educated couples to change their reproductive choices—an issue we intend to 
explore in this article. 
In Boccuzzo et al. (2008), we illustrate in detail the monetary policies adopted 
by FVG from 1989 to 2007. For the sake of our present objective it is particularly 
important to highlight changes which occurred between 1  January 2000 and 
1 January 2004, when the regional government introduced substantial bonuses at 
birth. These were much more generous and targeted to more specific groups than 
the policies adopted in the years which preceded and followed that period. In 
addition, the bonuses were based on several prerequisites: marital status (only 
married women eligible), citizenship (only couples with at least one Italian or EU 
partner eligible), and parity (no bonus for first births; €3,000 for second births; 
€4,600 for third and subsequent births). The maximum income threshold below 
which one received the bonus was rather high: €25,823 for women with one child 
and €46,481 for women with two children or more. While not comparable with 
measures introduced in other European countries, this is—to the best of our 
knowledge—the strongest birth-related monetary policy ever implemented in 
Italy after World War Two. Since 1 January 2004, the new regional government 
has extended the bonus to include unmarried women and non-EU foreigners who 
have lived in FVG for at least five years, but both the amount paid out and the 
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If the bonus indeed did have an impact on fertility, the reproductive behaviour 
of Italian married women during the years 2001-04 in FVG should have changed, 
and we should find differences by parity and education. Our main expectation is 
that we will find different patterns of behaviour among women without children, 
those with only one, and especially, among those with two or more children. We 
also expect to find a stronger effect for less educated (proxies of less rich) people, 
both because the bonus was not given to wealthier couples, and mainly because 
the relative magnitude of the bonus is higher the lesser the income. In addition, 
we should see no change among non-married couples and foreign families, as 
they were not eligible for the bonus. Finally, the behaviour of women living in 
FVG should diverge from that of women living in all other Italian regions, where 
no additional monetary family policies were implemented. 
In the following sections, we describe our data (Part 2) and methods (Part 3). 
In Part 4, we present the main results. Part 5 gives an overview of the results and 
their political relevance. The appendix shows the original data before and after the 
imputation of missing values. 
 
 
2  Data 
Data on births classified by mother’s education, parity, marital status, and 
citizenship were kindly provided by the Public Regional Health Administration of 
FVG (for 1989-2005). The source of births is the certificate of delivery care 
(CEDAP), adopted at the national level only in 2002 but available for previous 
years as well in FVG. The CEDAPs contain demographic and social variables 
about both parents, information concerning the pregnancy and the delivery, as 
well as the health of the newborn. The CEDAP file we dealt with did not have any 
data missing. Legal abortions for the years 1989-2005, classified by mother’s 
education, parity, marital status, and citizenship were kindly made available by 
the National Institute of Statistics (Istat). The data source with regard to abortions 
is an anonymous form for induced abortion, filled out at the hospital for each 
intervention and sent to the ISTAT. The form includes some information on 
woman (age, education, marital status, parity and citizenship) as well as some 
characteristics of the abortion. The coding of educational level was missing in 
some of the original data on abortions for years 1999, 2000 and 2001. These were 
redistributed in accordance with the known data distribution (see Appendix). The 
birth series from CEDAP of FVG were compared to the corresponding series of 
population registers, which showed only negligible differences. 
Unfortunately, as only a few other regions have such long-term series data, 
the CEDAP data cannot be used to compare trends in births between FVG and the 
rest of Italy. We therefore estimate the overall birth trends by women’s parity and 
education in Italy using data from the most recent ISTAT survey on women’s 
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(Multipurpose Survey of Families) was carried out in 2003 and consists of 
interviews with a representative sample of 49,541 individuals belonging to 19,227 
families. For our analysis we selected those women in the sample who were 
married at the time of birth of their child(ren) and were not residents in FVG. The 
sample obtained is representative of Italy as a whole, not including FVG. These 
data were not used for the region of FVG because the number of observations is 
too small. We therefore resorted to the CEDAP data. 
We then aggregated all births from these women according to birth order and 
the mother’s education (high vs. low) at the birth of each child for the years 1989-
2003, weighting each birth with the respective sample weight of the mother. 
Finally, using these time-series we estimated the index numbers of births (with 
the base in 1989 = 100) and compared them to those from the FVG series. It 
would have been preferable to compare the FVG data with those estimated for 
northern Italy only, as the two areas are more similar from the socio-economic 
viewpoint, but unfortunately due to the limited sample size this was impossible.  
 
 
3  Methods 
We measure whether fertility behaviour changed in FVG during 2001-04 for 
those women most directly affected by the new legislation (Italian married 
women with one or more children). As already described in the introductory 
section, we assume that the impact of monetary measures was higher for less 
educated women given that (1) in Italy the relationship between income and 
education is very strong (the lower the education, the lower the income) and (2), 
that the amount of the bonus,  given within a relatively high threshold of 
eligibility, was fixed (not dependent on income); consequently, its relative impact 
should be stronger in poorer families. Figure 1 shows the hypothetical 
relationships between bonus at birth and demographic events. In order to reliably 
test the causal relationship between the bonus at birth and individual reproductive 
decisions, one would have to compare the behaviour of those who received the 
bonus and those who, although otherwise very similar, were not eligible for the 
bonus.  However, the data needed to draw this comparison are not available 
because when FVG put the policy into practice, no effort was made to provide the 
statistical instruments necessary for evaluating the effects such policies had on the 
reproductive behaviour and well-being of the families involved.
1 
The remaining methodological possibility is to ‘simulate’ an experimental 
situation, using the available data. The idea is to identify different groups, 
distinguishing between them in terms of (1) their hypothetical eligibility for the 
bonus and (2) the hypothetical impact the former should have had on reproductive 
                                                 
1    The most famous example of demographic research conducted using an experimental 
framework is the Matlab Project (see e.g. Fauveau 1994; Samara et al. 1996). The impact of the bonus at birth on reproductive behaviour  130 
behaviour observed during the period in which the bonus was in force and in the 
preceding and following periods. If the groups most eligible for the bonus 
systematically modified their reproductive behaviour in the direction 
hypothesised (increase in the number of children and decrease in the number of 
abortions), and if no change were simultaneously observed among the other 
groups, than it is possible that the bonus indeed did have an impact. 
 
Figure 1: 
Hypothetical impact of the bonus at birth on women’s reproductive behaviour 
FOR ELIGIBLE WOMEN 
(i.e., women with at least 1 child with low or medium income)
WANTED CONCEPTIONS
Bonus FERTILITY RATES
at birth (BIRTHS / WOMEN)
% NOT WANTED
CONCEPTIONS
BECOMING BIRTHS
ABORTION RATIOS
(ABORTIONS /
ABORTION RATES CONCEPTIONS)
(ABORTIONS / WOMEN)
+
+
+
+
–
–
–
 
As mentioned above, our data allow us to identify the married women 
resident in FVG with low levels of education and two or more children as the 
most eligible and hypothetically most sensitive group to the bonus. The behaviour 
of these women is then compared with that of three other groups of FVG women 
who could have received the bonus but who would have received less money 
(women with one child) or for whom the bonus would comparatively have had 
less of an impact (women with higher levels of education). In addition, this 
comparison is extended to include FVG women without children, for whom (in 
the period considered) no bonus was foreseen for the birth of the first child. The 
other two groups that did not have a right to the bonus were foreigners and non-
married couples. However, because both the dynamics of births out of wedlock 
and the behaviour of foreign couples are so erratic in the period under 
consideration, it is practically impossible to use graphical methods for mapping 
the gaps during 2001-2004 compared to the trend in the preceding period. These 
groups will instead be considered within the multivariate analysis presented in 
Section 3.2. Finally, six groups of FVG women are compared to analogous groups 
resident in other Italian regions. If the reproductive behaviour observed in FVG Giovanna Boccuzzo et al.  131 
during the period in which the bonus was in effect was not repeated elsewhere 
(again, no other region had a comparable monetary policy supporting the national 
one) then the idea that a bonus had an impact on reproductive behaviour would be 
further strengthened. 
The logic used is therefore of a difference-in-difference (DD) kind
2: we 
observe how differences in the number of children and abortions change among 
different groups during the periods in which the bonus was in effect and when it 
was not. These groups are identified on the basis of hypothetical eligibility and 
sensitivity to the bonus:  
 
Hypothesis of the effect of the 2000-03 bonus on fertility 
 
     Parity   
  Education  0  1  2 and 
higher 
Married Italian women 
living in FVG 
Low  = ++  +++ 
  High  = +  ++ 
Married Italian women 
NOT living in FVG 
Low =  =  = 
  High =  =  = 
Note: +++ Strong effect, ++ Medium effect, + Weak effect, = No effect 
 
Following the DD framework, in order to confirm that the bonus did have an 
effect, observations of an increase in fertility among low educated married 
women living in FVG are not sufficient. We must also observe that non-eligible 
women did not change their reproductive behaviour. 
The  bonus was intended only for Italian couples with one child or more. 
However, it is possible that some couples, who were aware of the bonus but still 
without children, might have accelerated their fertility plans by rapidly having a 
first and then a second child. However, it is difficult to imagine this behaviour 
being widespread, given that the bonus policies changed too rapidly over time to 
effectively encourage couples to make long-term investments (Boccuzzo et al. 
2008). On the other hand, as only married couples were eligible for the bonus, 
some may have felt the incentive to tie the knot.  
As mentioned above, it was not possible to identify exactly the behaviour of 
those who could or could not receive the bonus. Consequently, no clear-cut causal 
reasoning can be applied to our analysis. Theoretically speaking, other 
unmeasured variables (e.g. ideational changes, gender equality, etc.) may have 
had a selective impact on some women, influencing their fertility trends. Our non-
experimental framework therefore provides only some insights as to the impact of 
                                                 
2   For a simple explanation of difference-in-difference rationale, see e.g. Angrist and Krueger 
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bonus. That said, our comparison between groups is wide enough (high parities 
vs. low parities, high education vs. low education, living in FVG vs. not living in 
FVG), that it is difficult to imagine that—if the previous framework fits our 
data—the bonus at birth might not have been significant.  
 
3.1 Graphical analysis  
To test—in a very simple way—the efficacy of the bonuses at birth implemented 
in the FVG region, we apply an analysis implemented earlier by Billari et al. 
(2005) in an analogous context.  
We compare trends in births and abortion ratios [Abortions /  
(Abortions+Births)] in two different groups, one that includes the women 
hypothetically eligible for the above-described monetary policies and the other 
one made up of those women who were not eligible. More specifically, we 
compare, separately for the two groups, the number of events (or ratios) observed 
in years 2001-04 against the number of events (or ratios) that would be expected 
in the same years if the trend between 1989 and 2000 had continued unchanged 
(Figure 2 and Tables 1 and 2).  
Then, we also evaluate the trend in births for married Italian women in FVG 
against the same trend for married women in Italy as a whole (excluding FVG), 
where the bonus at birth was not implemented (Figure 3).  
In both comparisons the statistical significance of the difference between 
actual events and hypothetical ones is measured by comparing the angular 
coefficient of the line extrapolating the 1989-2000 trend with that of the line 
interpolating the actual pattern during the period of 2001-04.  
 
3.2 Multivariate analysis 
In the graphical analysis described above, the choice of years used to determine 
the temporal trend was conditioned by the available data. If the trend were 
determined on the basis of more (or fewer) years than the entire 1989-2000 
interval, the results could change. In addition, trends in 1989-2000 may be 
influenced also by fluctuations of births and abortions due to several causes (e.g., 
changes in their timing). Finally, graphical analysis does not allow us to 
confidently determine the birth pattern over time among groups not eligible for 
the bonus (foreign women and/or not married) nor those most eligible (married 
Italian women with three or more children). In light of these obstacles, we use the 
same data for FVG to carry out a more refined analysis of the association between 
time and other variables, using log-linear (on births) and logistic (on abortion 
ratios) models. 
Criteria of eligibility for the bonus are based on four variables: civil status, 
income (we approximate this using the level of education), citizenship, and parity. 
We want to measure how these variables interacted when the bonus was in force. Giovanna Boccuzzo et al.  133 
For example, in the passage from the year 2000 to the following years, did the 
number of births among Italian women with two or more children increase? The 
log-linear model allows us to respond to this type of question, in that it 
decomposes the association between statistical variables, identifying their 
significant interactions.  
Our log-linear model takes into consideration the following variables and 
conditions:  
 
X = TIME: five periods corresponding to the main changes in family law: 
1989-92, 1993-99, 2000, 2001-03, 2004-05 (i = 1, …5). 
Y = MARITAL STATUS: married, not married (j = 1, 2). 
Z = EDUCATION: low (up to middle school), high (high school or university) 
(k = 1, 2)
3.  
W = CITIZENSHIP: EU community, outside EU (h=1,2) 
T = PARITY: 0, 1, 2, 3+ (m = 1, …4) 
 
As is evident, the level of detail is much greater than in the graphical analysis. 
In particular, by isolating the year 2000 and the period 2001-03, the effect of the 
bonus should emerge without further reference to the temporal trend. The 
categories of those who are more or less eligible for the bonus should also be 
more easily identifiable.  
The log-linear model is represented as follows (Agresti 2002): 
 
()
XYZWT
ijkhm
XYZW
ijkh
XYZ
ijk
YZ
jz
XZ
ik
XY
ij
T
m
W
h
Z
k
Y
j
X
i ijkhm λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ μ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + = ... ... ... log
(1) 
 
ijkhm μ  is the number of births in period i from women with civil status j, level 
of education k, citizenship h, and parity m. In model (1),  ijkhm μ  depends on an 
average general value (λ), on time X (through the principal effect 
X
i λ ), on civil 
status Y (
Y
j λ ), on level of education Z (
Z
k λ ) on citizenship W (
W
h λ ), on parity T 
(
T
m λ ), and on the interactions of these five variables. Equation (1) defines the 
saturated log-linear model, because it includes all of the possible interactions 
between the five variables, both in pairs (
YZ
jk
XZ
ik
XY
ij λ λ λ , , , …) and at higher levels, 
up to the interactions between all five 
XYZWT
ijkhm λ . The final model consists only of 
those parameters which were statistically significant. This includes several 
                                                 
3   The best split of the education levels related to income should be between high school and 
university, but the number of graduates is too low (see Appendix) to consider only this group 
versus the other three, because the analyses further divide the group in many sub-groups. 
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parameters which are ‘obviously’ significant. For example, 
Y
j λ  is the principal 
effect of civil status (i=1 married; i=2 not married). Due to the fact that during the 
period 1989-2005 in the rest of Italy, like in FVG, there were a noticeably higher 
number of births from married women, the parameter 
Y
1 λ  relative to married 
individuals is positive and always significant. Analogously, the model contains 
significant interactions by virtue of population or fertility dynamics. For example, 
the interaction between time and citizenship 
XZ
ih λ  will surely see 
XZ XZ
12 52 λ λ > , 
because during time 5 (2004-05), as a consequence of continuous immigration, 
the number of births from non-European women was much higher compared to 
time 1 (1989-92). 
In this analysis, we are interested only in those interactions which may 
indicate the effect of the bonus on reproductive behaviour, after controlling for all 
other significant conditions. Because the bonus was granted for such a short 
period of time, and only to Italian married women with less than a given income 
(which we approximated by way of the level of education) and with more than 
one child, we focus our attention on two higher-order interactions: 
 
- 
XYZT
ijkm λ : interaction among time, marital status, education and parity 
 
- 
XYWT
ijhm λ : interaction among time, marital status, citizenship and parity 
 
The bonus may have had an effect if significant statistical changes in 
XYZT
ijkm λ  
and 
XYWT
ijhm λ  are observed in the shift from period 3 (2000) to period 4 (2001-03). If 
the bonus worked, we should see 
XYZT
3114 λ < 
XYZT
4114 λ  (less educated married women of 
high parity having more children in 2001-03 than in 2000), whereas for the 
groups not affected by the bonus the differences between 
XYZT
jkm 3 λ  and 
XYZT
jkm 4 λ  
should not be statistically significant. Analogously, we should see
XYWT
3114 λ < 
XYWT
4114 λ  
(married EU women of high parity having had more children during 2001-2003 
than in 2000), whereas for the groups not affected by the bonus the difference 
between
XYWT
jkm 4 λ and 
XYWT
jkm 3 λ  should not be statistically significant either. 
The strategy is to (a) estimate the model which best fits the data; (b) verify 
that the model includes interactions of interest to this project; and (c) verify if the 
interactions work in the direction hypothesised. 
The procedure to select the ‘best’ model was employed as follows. First, the 
significant interactions were selected using a backward  hierarchical approach: 
beginning with the saturated model, we excluded the non-significant interactions 
(CATMOD procedure using SAS). Second, using the model thus obtained, the 
excluded interactions were inserted one at a time in order to evaluate if—when Giovanna Boccuzzo et al.  135 
considered individually—their specific contribution to the representation of the 
data was significant. We thus developed the final model which considers only the 
significant interactions, and therefore is no longer of a hierarchical nature (i.e. the 
presence in the model of a high-level interaction effect does not imply the 
presence of corresponding lower-level effects). 
With regard to abortions, we used a logistic model (using the ratio of 
abortions to births as a dependent variable): 
XYZWT
ijkhm
XY
ij
T
m
W
h
Z
k
Y
j
X
i
ijkhm
ijkhm
ijkhm logit β β β β β β β α
π
π
π + + + + + + + + =
−
= ....
1
log ) ( (2) 
where ijkhm π  is the ratio of abortions to births corresponding to time i, civil status 
j, citizenship h, level of education k, and parity m. The parameters β define the 
effect of the explanatory variables on ratio π.  Compared to the log-linear model, 
the logistic model does not consider absolute numbers but rather relative 
numbers; hence the effects of the population structure are not present.  
Analogous to the explanation above, we are interested above all in 
XYZT
ijkm β  
and
XYWT
ijhm β , which become meaningful when we see a significant reduction in the 
parameters regarding married women with many children and low education or 
Italian citizenship in the shift from 2000 to the next period.   
 
 
4  Results 
4.1 Graphical analysis  
We compare actual births and abortion ratios of married Italian women in FVG in 
2001-04 with expected births and abortion ratios for the same women if the trend 
for 1989-2000 remained unchanged (Figure  2). We examine births to women 
specified by their parity status and education. The main results are as follows: 
1. There is a remarkable divergence between birth trends and actual births in 
2001-04 for women with two or more children, mostly attributable to women with 
low levels of education (who were supposedly more responsive to a bonus).  
2. Conversely, there is no effect for low educated women with parity 0 and 1. 
Thus, the FVG fertility policy may have affected only poor women with access to 
the relatively largest bonus. 
3. The changes were less intense for women with the highest levels of 
education, but here they also affected women who had only one child before. 
4. Abortion ratios for low educated women decreased in 2001-04 mostly 
among those with two or more children, but also for women who already had one 
child. For high-educated women, changes took place only among those with 
parity two or higher.  
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Finally, we compare the births to women with two or more children in FVG 
with those in the rest of Italy (Figure 3). The index numbers for low-educated 
women diverged noticeably after 2000: in FVG there was an upward divergence 
from the previous trend, whereas in the rest of Italy the previous decrease 
intensified. Differences for high-educated women with two or more children were 
less marked, although a slight increase in FVG could be observed, while generally 
in Italy the trend did not change. 
In Table  1 we show the differences between the actual number of births 
recorded in 2001-04 and the birth trend projection from 1989-2000. The number 
of births increased for women with parity  1 and 2+, whereas it decreased for 
women without children. In Table 2, we compare observed abortion ratios with 
those expected according to the projections based on the 1989-2000 trend. 
Abortion ratios decreased for women with parity 2+, especially for low-educated 
women but also for high-educated women. The differences diminished for women 
of parity 1 and disappeared for those of parity 0.  
 
Table 1: 
Number of children by parity (0, 1, 2+) and education (low, high) during 2001-04. 
Difference between actual numbers and projections from the 1989-2000 trend. 
Married Italian women living in FVG 
 Education   
 Parity  Low  High  Total 
 0  -650  -422  -1.072 
 1  +103  +434  537 
 2+  +332  +157  489 
Total -215  169  -46 
 
Table 2: 
Abortion ratios by parity (0, 1, 2+) and education (low, high) during 2001-04. 
Difference between actual ratios and projections from the 1989-2000 trend. Married 
Italian women living in FVG 
  Low education  High education 
 Parity  Parity 
 0  1  2+  0  1  2+ 
2001 0 -2 -3 0  0  -1 
2002 0 -1 -2 1  0  -4 
2003 0 -2 -8 1  -1 -3 
2004 2  1 -8 1  0  -1 
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Figure 2: 
Graphical analysis for FVG. Actual births and projection from 1989-2000 trend 
Births 
Women with low education and 2+ children 
Variable Coeff.  s.e.  t  P  >│t│ 
Trend -21.2554  2.2196  -9.58  0.000 
Dummy before/after 2000  77.9902  23.8646  3.27  0.006 
Constant 471.7337  16.4610  28.66  0.000 
R-squared = 0.9097 
F(2, 14) = 70.54 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Women with high education and 2+ children 
Variable Coeff.  s.e.  t  P  >│t│ 
Trend 4.8371  1.6068  3.03  0.009 
Dummy before/after 2000  35.7765  17.2762  2.07  0.057 
Constant 266.8349  11.9166  22.39  0.000 
R-squared = 0.8168 
F(2, 14) = 31.22 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Births (continued) 
Women with low education and 1 child 
Variable Coeff.  s.e.  t  P  >│t│ 
Trend -57.3300  3.4943  -16.41  0.000 
Dummy before/after 2000  22.0564  37.5696  0.59  0.567 
Constant 1725.8776  25.9143  66.60  0.000 
R-squared = 0.9798 
F(2, 14) = 339.06 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Actual Until 2000 After 2000
 
 
Women with low education and no children 
Variable Coeff.  s.e.  T  P  >│t│ 
Trend -79.3820  4.7931  -16.56  0.000 
Dummy before/after 2000  -159.1715  51.5341  -3.09  0.008 
Constant 2247.5850  35.5465  63.23  0.000 
R-squared = 0.9858 
F(2, 14) = 486.28 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Abortion ratios 
Women with low education and 2+ children 
Variable Coeff.  s.e.  t  P  >│t│ 
Trend -0.0062  0.0019  -3.22  0.006 
Dummy before/after 2000  -0.0463  0.0208  -2.23  0.043 
Constant 0.6027  0.0144  42.00  0.000 
R-squared = 0.8356  
F(2, 14) = 35.57 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Women with high education and 2+ children 
Variable Coeff.  s.e.  t  P  >│t│ 
Trend -0.0069  0.0020  -3.17  0.007 
Dummy before/after 2000  -0.0214  0.0213  -1.01  0.332 
Constant 0.4251  0.0147  28.95  0.000 
R-squared = 0.7542  
F(2, 14) = 21.48 
Prob > F = 0.0001 
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Abortion ratios (continued) 
Women with low education and 1 child 
Variable Coeff.  s.e.  t  P  >│t│ 
Trend -0.0054  0.0010  -5.53  0.000 
Dummy before/after 2000  -0.0113  0.0106  -1.07  0.303 
Constant 0.1871  0.0073  25.61  0.000 
R-squared = 0.8865  
F(2, 14) = 54.70 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Women with low education and no children 
Variable Coeff.  s.e.  t  P  >│t│ 
Trend -0.0000  0.0005  -5.53  0.987 
Dummy before/after 2000  0.0076  0.0054  -1.07  0.180 
Constant 0.0294  0.0037  25.61  0.000 
R-squared = 0.2712  
F(2, 14) = 2.60 
Prob > F = 0.1092 
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Figure 3: 
Index numbers of births (1989=100). Married Italian women living/not living in 
FVG. Actual births and projection from 1989-2000 trend. 
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4.2 Multivariate analysis 
We focus our analysis on the interactions between time, marital status, parity, and 
education (or citizenship): 
XYZT
ijkm λ  and
XYWT
ijhm λ . Both are statistically significant, and 
when omitted from the model cause a noticeable drop in the goodness-of-fit 
(p<0.01). Figure 4 shows the outcome of these interactions by parity in 2000 and 
in 2001-03, for married women who were citizens of the EU (a) and married low-
educated women (b). The higher the interaction, the higher the number of 
corresponding births: during 2001-03 the direction of the interactions with parity 
drastically changed, favouring births among women with two or more children. 
As hypothesised in Section 3.2, we observe
XYZT
3114 λ < 
XYZT
4114 λ  (less-educated married 
women of high parity had more children in 2001-03 than in 2000) and
XYWT
3114 λ < 
XYWT
4114 λ (married women of high parity and with EU citizenship had more children 
during 2001-03 than in 2000). With regard to the logistic model of induced 
abortion, the results (not shown here, available on request) do not conflict with 
our expectations, although a clear change in the sign of the parameters is not 
present when moving from low to high parities, as observed in the log-linear 
model for births. 
 
Figure 4: 
Log-linear model on births: interaction of time, parity, marital status, citizenship 
and education in FVG 
(a) Married women, citizens of European Union 
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(b) Married low educated women 
0
0
1
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-0.15
0
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Note: The components of each interaction sum to zero 
 
 
5  Conclusions 
In this paper we studied the case of the northern Italian region of Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia, where a fertility policy offering considerable monetary bonus at birth was 
implemented in the years 2000-2003. We analysed the differences between the 
observed number of births and abortion ratios in years 2001-2004 and projected 
births and abortions ratios based on the assumption of the previous (1989-2000) 
trend remaining unchanged. We found noteworthy differences between women 
hypothetically non-eligible and eligible for the bonus at birth, especially for those 
with two or more children and low education. This result is strengthened by the 
fact that in other regions of Italy—where no monetary measures were 
implemented in addition to those already adopted at the national level—we 
observe no significant variation in birth trends for the same period and the same 
groups of women. 
We can thus confirm—albeit within the limits of this study—that the bonus 
may have contributed to increasing higher-order births in FVG, particularly for 
women with low levels of education who already had at least two children. As the 
number of these women is relatively low, the estimated effect on total fertility 
was modest. Our analysis indicates that around 1,000 more births than expected 
by trend extrapolation took place in the four-year period of 2001-2004, which 
represents an increase of 2-3% in total births (but about 20% or more in births of 
birth order 3 and higher).  The impact of the bonus at birth on reproductive behaviour  144 
This pattern could be explained by a tempo effect. In other words, the bonus 
may have simply accelerated the birth of a planned child (leading to a change in 
birth timing rather than inducing a permanent effect of the bonus on fertility). 
Further investigation will only become feasible, however, when it will be possible 
to compare, at the end of their reproductive lives, the completed fertility of these 
cohorts. However, our results indicate that the abortion ratio of low educated 
women with two or more children has also been influenced by the bonus. This 
may be interpreted as a sign of the effect of the bonus on the quantum of births, as 
these women used abortion to limit rather than postpone fertility. 
The importance of our results is further highlighted by comparable results for 
Italy obtained by Billari et al. (2005), who studied the effects of monetary aid 
provided to families with three or more children (introduced by the Turco law of 
1999). Over the last thirty years, both Italy and FVG have been characterised by a 
large gap between desired and actual fertility and this discrepancy is particularly 
marked for poorer couples. 
This is not to say that the best way to help Italian couples who would like 
more children is to generalise the bonus-at-birth program. The motives behind 
having a child or not are quite complex and diverse. Economic reasons, in all 
probability, are important only for poorer couples who already have one or two 
children. Moreover, in the survey mentioned in the introduction, women 
suggested that substantive monetary transfers over the first three years after the 
birth of a child would have convinced them to have a second or third child (De 
Santis and Breschi 2003). Continuous monetary aid over time is thus seen more 
favourably than a substantial one-time bonus at birth. More generally, a reduction 
in the direct costs of childrearing may be effective in raising fertility among low-
income Italian women, freeing them from the constraints associated with limited 
economic resources. 
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